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NOTES
STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT IMPOSED UPON
AN ENTIRE INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
A consumer must often buy products from competitive mar-
kets. When merchandising his products, however, a manufacturer
first considers the appearance of his product, its performance and
sometimes its potential obsolescence; safety to the consumer "might
be called the low man on the merchandising totem pole."' The cost
of product-related injuries might exceed $5.5 billion annually in the
United States 2- and at least part of the problem lies with voluntary
safety standards adopted by an industry. There are "instances
where an industry's notion of a standard . . .[seems] to be what-
ever . . .[is] a little better than shoddy."3 When the consumer is
injured by a defective product, he should be given the most ade-
quate compensation that American industry can provide. What
form can this protection take? Consider the following problems
which illustrate the plight of the consumer.
Mr. Bartelli was injured when a ladder he purchased from a
hardware store collapsed. The ladder, manufactured by the Acme
Ladder Manufacturing Company, was most likely defective when
manufactured; the suspected defect probably caused the ladder to
collapse and injure Mr. Bartelli. Nevertheless, Mr. Bartelli's claim
was stated in terms of negligence. At trial, a booklet of industry
standards (probably defective) was introduced by the manufacturer
as evidence of the standard of care required in the manufacture of
ladders. The Acme Ladder Manufacturing Company proved that it
had complied with these standards, and hence, no negligence was
found and Mr. Bartelli was denied recovery.4
Consumers Union, a major product investigation body, has in-
dicated that something is amiss in the standards of production
1. Hearing on Product Safety Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., ser. 91-82, at 4 (1970).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 6.
4. These facts are adapted from the case of Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling &
Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969).
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adopted by every member of the automobile industry. Commenting
on the frequency of defects discovered among models tested in 1963,
it stated:
In anything as complicated as a car, pure chance will
play a part in the presence or absence of troubles. But
something more than chance is at work when 32 out of 32
cars chosen at random for testing show troubles of one kind
or another in the first few thousand miles.'
Consumers Union continued its criticism of the automobile manu-
facturing industry:
In 1964 things were slightly better; two or three of the 35
cars purchased for testing didn't develop troubles at least
in the first 3000 miles. This year [1965] it looks as though
things are back to normal again-that is, all fouled up-in
the output of Detroit.'
These two instances suggest an emerging problem in the field
of products liability, viz., the potential liability of an entire industry
when a consumer or user is injured by a defective product manufac-
tured by the industry. The application of 'strict liability in tort is
rapidly expanding and the time may come when the doctrine should
be imposed on an entire industry. This note will examine the ex-
panding concepts of strict liability presently imposed upon a sup-
plier of goods and the possible future application of such concepts
to an entire industry. For the purposes of this note, the term "entire
industry" will be used to denote a group of manufacturers who
produce a similar product. The following section will briefly trace
the growth of products liability which has culminated in the devel-
opment of strict liability in tort.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILYry
Negligence
Products liability, as we know it today, began its development
in the 19th century, at which time recovery was based upon negli-
gence. Recovery under the existing negligence law was generally
limited by the requirement of privity;7 however, an exception to the
5. The Rising Cost of Repairs: Two Looks at the Record, 28 CONSUMER REP. 464, 468
(1963).
6. Quality Control, Warranties, and a Crisis in Confidence, 30 CONSUMER REP. 175
(1965).
7. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
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requirement of privity was made for "inherently dangerous items." 8
Under this exception, a plaintiff could recover by showing that he
was injured while using a dangerous product that had been negli-
gently manufactured.? In time such law became impossible to
apply-by 1908 a loaded gun, a defective gun, defective hair wash,
scaffolds, a defective coffee urn, mislabeled poison and a defective
aerated bottle were deemed dangerous items,'0 while a defective
balance wheel for a circular saw, a bursting lamp, a defective car-
riage and a defective boiler were deemed nondangerous." Finally
this exception to the privity requirement swallowed the rule; 2 the
manufacturer who placed a product on the market assumed respon-
sibility to the consumer for foreseeable harm if the former had failed
to exercise proper care in the manufacture of his product.'3 Judge
Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,I4 was the first to abol-
ish the requirement of privity; immediately thereafter, the decision
was accepted and applied throughout the United States.'5
A manufacturer's negligence had often been found by a jury
through the application of res ipsa loquitur;'6 however, numerous
injuries from defective products have been recorded in situations
where the manufacturer was not negligent. In such cases the injured
plaintiffs have been either denied recovery, or if more fortunate,
granted recovery upon a rather tenuous finding of negligence. In a
concurring opinion, Judge Traynor cut through the fiction and pro-
posed that strict liability be imposed openly," basing his opinion
upon a public policy that would force manufacturers to take steps
to reduce hazards to life and health. This policy would be imple-
mented by the imposition of strict liability in tort upon a manufac-
turer of a defective product when that product, because of its defect,
caused injury to a user or consumer.'"
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. E. LEVi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 18 (13th ed. 1970).
11. Id.
12. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13. Id.
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
15. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
16. See 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrr §§ 2:117-2:120 (1961); Pros-
ser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114-
15 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 842 (1966).
17. Escola v. Coca Cola Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, -, 150 P.2d 436, 439
(1944) (separate opinion).
18. [Ilt should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute
1973]
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Warranty
Paralleling the development of negligence as a basis for recov-
ery in products liability cases was that of warranty. Liability based
upon warranty was supposed to make the manufacturer an insurer
of the safety of his product in spite of his exercise of all reasonable
care. 9 Such an action, of course, required privity of contract; how-
ever, courts resorted to ingenious (and fictitious) reasoning in order
to satisfy this requirement."0 The fictions which proved the most
convincing were (1) that the warranty "ran with the goods," and
(2) that the warranty was made directly to the consumer." Never-
theless, it was apparent that liability was in fact grounded in tort
although expressed in contract.2 2 In an article written in 1960, Pros-
ser listed nine conceptual difficulties present when warranty law is
used for consumer protection: (1) there is no real contract between
the plaintiff and defendant; (2) not all injuries are within the pur-
view of damages for breach of contract (e.g., wrongful death); (3) a
plaintiff rarely relies upon a warranty of the seller (although such
is traditionally required by the law of contracts); (4) the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code allow
recovery only for a plaintiff who is a "buyer" (or in the case of the
Uniform Commercial Code, a member of the buyer's family, house-
hold or guest); (5) under the Uniform Sales Act a warranty of
fitness arose only if the buyer relied upon the seller's skill and made
his purposes known to him; (6) many injured consumers are una-
ware that most statutes require prompt notice of breach of warranty
by the buyer to the seller; (7) under the Uniform Sales Act, if a
buyer rescinded a sale, he could not bring an action for breach of
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings. . . . Even if there is no negligence . .. public policy demands that respon-
sibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market ...
• * ' If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for
their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility
openly.
Id. at -, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (separate opinion).
19. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97 (4th ed. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. Rv. 119, 153-55
(1957), wherein 29 ways that the courts have "found" the requisite privity are discussed.
21. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960).
22. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv.
791, 842 (1966).
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warranty; (8) a warranty is subject to a disclaimer by a seller; and
(9) even if a warranty runs with the goods, it can protect only the
person who holds title.23
In his decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,'24
Judge Traynor cut through the fictions of sales warranties by impos-
ing upon a seller strict liability for the sale of a defective lathe. The
effect of this decision was widespread-many courts adopted the
grounds of strict liability in tort as the proper basis of recovery.25
Strict Liability in Tort: Restatement Position
In 1965, the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 6 adopted guide-
lines for the imposition of strict liability in tort upon the seller of a
product causing physical harm to a user or consumer:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
23. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1127-34 (1960). See also Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About
Allocation of Risks, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1329, 1330-33 (1966).
24. 59 Cal. App. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Judge Traynor noted:
Although . . . strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express
or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandon-
ment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability
is not assumed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope
of its own responsibility for defective products make clear that the liability is not one
governed by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and govern-
ing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions
cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured
by their defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for which such
liability is imposed.
• . . The purpose of . . . [strict] liability is to insure the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves. Sales warranties serve this purpose fitfully at best. "The reme-
dies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the
law of sales."
Id. at __, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 [citations omitted].
25. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
JiS, WU4 (Ilt, O).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOaTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT
II and referred to as Restatement III.
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(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.27
In consideration of the widening imposition of strict liability in tort,
these guidelines will be considered as the norm and extensions from
that norm will be examined.
Past Extensions of Strict Liability in Tort
Strict liability in tort has been imposed upon parties who do not
literally fall within the rule set down by the Restatement II, i.e.,
some defendants have not been "sellers." Two extensions of the
nonseller category will be examined. Consider the marketing pro-
cess to be a vertical line; a product has its origin at a point at the
top of the line and ultimately reaches the consumer or user at the
bottom of the line. Between these two points the product may be
manufactured, assembled, wholesaled, leased, retailed and so
forth. The manufacturer appears on the line at its midpoint. Strict
liability in tort may (or may not) then be imposed on parties who
appear (1) downward from this point or (2) upward from this point.
(Note that a further extension of strict liability in tort could be
outward. The courts' treatment of this extension is dealt with in the
footnote.) 2
27. RESTATEMENT II § 402A. Note that an "unreasonably dangerous condition" is diffi-
cult to define. Perhaps the Illinois Supreme Court came closest when it said that "those
products are defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner
reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function." Dunham v.
Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969). See also Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 819
(1972); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363 (1965). Therefore, it will be assumed that a defective product is in fact "unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer" in all situations throughout the remainder of this
note.
28. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 724, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322-23
(2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972), refers to the upward and downward directions in a marketing chain.
A third extension of strict liability in tort might be considered to be outward strict
[Vol. 7
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Downward strict liability in tort is liability which is imposed
upon a defendant who is himself the manufacturer or who is in the
marketing chain of a product already produced by a manufacturer.
Note that the rule of the Restatement I is one of downward strict
liability, i.e., it applies only to sellers. 9 Courts have extensively
expanded downward strict liability from this norm by finding sell-
ers,30 builders and vendors,3' lessors, 32 licensors 33 and the vendor of
a hybrid sales-service 34 strictly liable. Plaintiffs who were not the
ultimate users or consumers have also been awarded damages in
strict liability.33 Although Restatement 11 advises against imposition
of strict liability when a product is "unavoidably unsafe, ' 36 damages
have nonetheless been awarded in such situations. 7
liability, which would be imposed on a party who is not in the vertical marketing chain of a
product for some reason. To date, no plaintiff has been granted recovery based on strict
liability in tort from a party who appears outside of the vertical marketing chain of a product;
this, however, does not mean that no plaintiff has ever sought recovery from such a defendant.
In Hanberry v. Hearst Corporation, 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1969), the defendant Hearst was the publisher of Good Housekeeping magazine and
issued the "Good Housekeeping's Consumers' Guaranty Seal" to products which it believed
to be satisfactory. Plaintiff was injured through the use of a product so endorsed. The court
held that an action in negligent misrepresentation could be stated against Hearst but that
the issue of strict liability in tort was not before the court. In Hempstead v. General Fire
Extinguisher Corporation, 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967), plaintiff was injured when a fire
extinguisher manufactured by General Fire Extinguisher Corporation and endorsed by Un-
derwriter's Laboratories, Inc. exploded. The court held that an action could be stated against
Underwriter's for negligence in approving the design of the fire extinguisher manufactured
by General; an action in strict liability was disallowed.
To impose strict liability in tort upon a defendant outside of the marketing chain of a
product would, of course, make him an indemnitor of the seller of the defective good. See
notes 78-85 infra and accompanying text.
29. RESTATEMENT II §§ 402A, comment f at 350-51.
30. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. App. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969);
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); see also RESTATEMENT II
§ 402A, comment a at 348.
31. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. (1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1969); Schipper v. Levit & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 319 (1965).
32. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. App.
3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); McCaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co.,
274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-
Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970).
33. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
34. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
35. White v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Ill. 1971); Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 70 Cal. App. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Johnson v. Standard
Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 3d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Mitchell
v. vili r, 26 Cumi. Supp. 142, 214 A.26 694 (Sulper. 0i. New Haven counuy i965).
36. RESTATEMENT II § 402A, comment k at 353-54.
37. It is generally agreed that there is no way to detect the presence of serum hepatitis
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Upward strict liability is imposed upon a defendant whose
product is ultimately incorporated into a finished product by an-
other manufacturer, or upon a defendant who serves some necessary
function in the production of an item. Courts have imposed strict
liability upon such defendants even though this liability is not sug-
gested by the Restatement 11.38 Some examples are presented below.
Strict liability in tort has been extended upward to the manu-
facturer of a component part, as in the case of Suvada v. White
Motor Co. 9 The plaintiff therein purchased a used tractor from the
defendant who had installed a brake system manufactured by
Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Company (which was
also named as defendant in the case). The brake system failed,
causing a collision with a bus; passengers on the bus were injured
and the tractor and bus were damaged. The plaintiff incurred the
costs of repairing his tractor, repairing the bus and settling personal
injury claims brought by injured passengers. In holding Bendix lia-
ble for these costs, the court said:
It appears that White did not make any change in the brake
system manufactured by Bendix but merely installed it
into the tractor unit. Under these circumstances we see no
reason why Bendix should not come within the rule of strict
liability.4°
This is an example of upward strict liability in tort imposed upon a
defendant who placed into the stream of commerce a defective
product which was ultimately incorporated into a finished product.
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.4" illustrates upward strict liabil-
ity imposed upon a trademark licensor or franchisor. 2 In that case,
plaintiff was injured when his gun exploded because of an excessive
charge of power in a shotgun shell. The shell had been manufac-
tured by Cartuchos Deportivos De Mexico, S.A. (CDM), which was
in blood. In Reilly v. King County Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (Ct.
App., Div. 1 1971), the litigants stipulated that detecting the disease-producing agent in the
blood is presently impossible. Nevertheless, the court held the defendant strictly liable be-
cause the producer was deemed to be more able to sustain the loss than the injured individual.
In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1971), the
court pointed out that comment k pertains only to products which are not defective. Infected
blood is defective and hence defendant was held strictly liable.
38. See RESTATEMENT II § 402A, Comment on Caveat q.
39. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
40. Id. at 625, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
41. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
42. See Note, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors, 55 Iowa L. REv. 693 (1969).
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the licensed manufacturer of Remington shotgun shells in Mexico;
CDM's packages were marketed under Remington's name.43 Revers-
ing a jury verdict for the defendant, the California court of appeals
held Remington strictly liable,indicating that strict liability should
be imposed "upon the overall producing and marketing enterprise
responsible for placing such products in the stream of commerce,""
regardless of the defendant's lack of control over the cause of the
defect. The court found that Remington's involvement in the enter-
prise was sufficient to make the company an integral part of the
entire business process which placed the defective shell in the
stream of commerce. This is an example of upward strict liability
imposed upon a defendant who had served a function (i.e., licensed
another to manufacture shells with its trademark) in the manufac-
ture of the ultimate injury-producing device.
It has been indicated that strict liability might even be imposed
upon an entire industry through its trade association. Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co.4" was a consolidation of two cases. 46
Each case arose as the result of injuries to the plaintiff children
caused by the premature detonation of blasting caps. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss; in Chance, this motion was denied, while
in Hall, the motion was granted. Each case is considered separately
below.
Chance involved an action for damages against six manufactur-
ers of blasting caps and the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME).
Plaintiffs sought to establish joint liability among the defendants.
Each plaintiff child had come into the possession of a dynamite
blasting cap which had no warning attached to it and which was
easily detonated by the child. The key allegations of the complaint
were that the explosions had destroyed any evidence as to the ident-
43. CDM had entered into three contracts with Remington: a trademark license agree-
ment, a contract for the sale of technical information and a technical services contract. The
trademark license agreement allowed CDM to put the Remington name on shells for a royalty
of 0.5 percent of all of CDM's net sales. The sale of technical information contract involved
the sale of scientific processes for the sum of $100,000. The technical services contract gave
Remington a 1.5 percent royalty on all net sales in exchange for expert personnel and assis-
tance in production and marketing of the shells. Remington also owned 40 percent of the
common stock of CDM and had four of its officials on CDM's board of directors.
44. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 724, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis added).
45. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
46. Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc. and Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
1973]
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ity of the manufacturer of the cap and that the labeling and design
practices of the industry had prevented a warning of the dangers of
blasting caps. These labeling and design practices were the result
of conscious agreement and industry-wide cooperation among the
defendants.
The court considered both negligence and strict liability theo-
ries of recovery, and held that a claim could be stated against the
defendants under either theory.47 This is an example of the possible
imposition of upward strict liability upon a defendant who has
served a function in order that the ultimate product might be pro-
duced in the manner that it was; here, that function was the setting
of standards which precluded a warning on individual blasting caps.
The Hall case was a consolidation of three cases in which the
allegations of the complaint identified the manufacturers of the
injury-producing caps-two of the plaintiffs were injured by Her-
cules caps and the other was injured by a Du Pont cap. The IME
was originally named as a defendant, but was dropped on plaintiffs'
motion in order to preserve diversity jurisdiction.I Each of the three
claims was brought against both Hercules and Du Pont and each
sought joint liability. The court, however, would not allow joint
liability in such a situation; it was considered to be an unnecessary
burden on the defendant who had not produced the injury-causing
cap and an undue burden on the court.49
Strict Liability in Tort: Conclusions
From the foregoing discussion two conclusions can be drawn as
to the imposition of strict liability in tort upon a defendant when a
plaintiff has suffered injury or property damage from the use of a
defective product. First, liability will be imposed upon a defendant
who provides the product to the user or consumer. Second, liability
will be imposed upon a defendant who causes the product to be in
a defective condition or who serves a function in the production of
a product.50
47. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
48. Id. at 382.
49. Id. at 383.
50. It should be noted that not all jurisdictions have accepted strict liability in tort as
a grounds for recovery for an injury caused by a product sold in a defective condition to the
user or consumer; hence, the conclusions stated would be totally without basis in those states.
See, e.g., Moore v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Del. , 282 A.2d 625 (1971); Stovall & Co.
v. Tate, 124 Ga. App. 605, 184 S.E.2d 834 (1971).
[Vol. 7
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These conclusions serve as the basis for the discussion which
follows. The possible imposition of strict liability in tort upon an
entire industry will now be considered.
INDUSTRY-WIDE STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT AND ITS JUSTIFICATION
In justifying industry-wide strict liability in tort, three con-
siderations are important: (1) the element of control wielded by an
industry over the nature of the final product; (2) the industry's
ability to spread the risk of injuries which result from defects to an
even greater extent than a single manufacturer; and (3) the court's
willingness to expand the concept of enterprise liability.
Control of the Cause of the Defect
The strict liability rule of the Restatement 11 is one applicable
basically to sellers. It has been demonstrated, however, that courts
are also willing to impose strict liability upon those who, although
not sellers, exercise a degree of control over the final product."
There may be times when an entire industry controls some of the
features that a product finally assumes; such acts of control might
justifiably expose the entire industry to strict liability in tort.
Control may be effectuated by an industry's imposition or
adoption of standards. While it is considered rare for a group of
manufacturers to adopt an all-pervasive code,5" the cases do suggest
that a good number of industries exist in which members adopt
certain standards, such as standards of production and safety. 3
This suggests that the place where precautions should be taken is
within the entire industry itself. The types of defective standards
51. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
52. See Krum & Greenhill, The Extent of Industry Self-Regulation Through Trade
Association Codes of Ethics, 17 ANTrrUST BuLL. 379, 386 (1972), wherein the authors indicate
that only a few trade associations have so much as a code of ethics; most of the associations
that do have such a code do not enforce it.
53. An example of this is indicated by the number of negligence cases in which industry
custom is sought to be used as a defense to the court's finding of a higher standard of care
required of a manufacturer. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 33 (4th ed. 1971) and cases
collected therein. See also Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash.
2d 629, 453 P.2d 619 (1969), holding that an industry-wide standard was an acceptable
standard of care largely because of the degree of research that went into establishing the
standards and the number of groups outside the industry who participated in setting the
i1Ld1UbLry-widt bLa1udaruS.
1973]
et al.: Strict Liability in Tort Imposed Upon an Entire Industry
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
428 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
that may be adopted by an industry are varied, e.g., design or test-
ing standards, 4 or defective labeling and warning practices.55
Defective industry-wide standards suggest that it is the entire
industry which has caused a product to be in a defective condition.
When an injury is caused by the presence of such defective stan-
dards, it is not the individual manufacturer acting alone who is
solely responsible for the injury, but rather the entire industry.
Hence, if an industry does impose or adopt standards, it should
exercise precautions to make sure they are not defective.
To illustrate, consider the first example, i.e., the case of the
defective ladder. The Acme Ladder Manufacturing Company pro-
duced its product in compliance with defective industry-wide stan-
dards; an injury resulted which was caused by the defective stan-
dards. The manufacturer had not acted alone in determining the
final nature of his product-his individual actions were not the sole
reason for the presence of the defect. Accountability for the pres-
ence of the defect lay within the entire industry which had estab-
lished defective standards; thus, strict liability might justifiably be
imposed upon the entire industry. If liability were imposed upon the
entire industry, it would stem from the control that the industry
exercised over its members' products.
In Chance,"6 strict liability might, be imposed upon an entire
54. Cases holding that defective design justifies imposition of strict liability in tort:
Runnings v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1972) (involving defectively designed
placement of a radiator cap; court applied Washington law); Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339
F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (involving defectively designed overhead guard on a fork lift; court
applied New York law); Haragan v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Alas. 1970) (involv-
ing defectively designed gas detection system; court applied Alaska law); Wagner v. Coronet
Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (Ct. App., Div. 1 1969) (involving defectively designed
bath mat); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301 (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1970) (involving defectively designed washing machine); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel
Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970) (involving defectively designed automatic door);
Garcia v. Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App., 1st Dist. 1971) (involving
defectively designed wire rope); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.,
Waco 1970) (involving defectively designed dough-rolling machine).
55. Cases holding that defective labeling and warning practices justify imposition of
strict liability in tort: Alman Brothers Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc.,
437 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving inadequate warnings about the possible dangers of
an animal vaccine; court applied Mississippi law); Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th
Cir. 1970) (involving inadequate warning about the dangers of baseball sunglasses; court
applied Indiana law); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr.
552 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (involving inadequate warning about dangers of dynamite fuses).
See also RESTATEMENT II § 402A, commentj at 353, indicating that a product may be rendered
unreasonably dangerous without adequate directions or warnings on the container.
56. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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industry primarily because evidence of the identity of the specific
injury-causing blasting caps was destroyed. In Hall,57 strict tort lia-
bility could not be imposed because the manufacturers of the spe-
cific injury-causing blasting caps were identified and because plain-
tiffs failed to state their claim against the entire industry. 5 The
limitation of Chance-i.e., that the manufacturer of the particular
defective injury-causing product cannot be identified-breaks down
in light of the foregoing discussion; if liability is to be imposed on
those who cause a defect to be present, it should be done irrespective
of whether the manufacturer of the defective injury-producing de-
vice can be ascertained.
Ability to Spread the Risk
A favorite argument for imposing strict liability upon the seller
of a defective product is the ability of the manufacturer to distribute
the risk among the public at large. 9 Note that this argument applies
even if the party held liable exercises no control over the presence
of the defect; this is demonstrated by courts which have held retail-
ers, lessors and licensors strictly liable." Certainly these parties
have little control over the presence of a defect. The manufacturer
should afford protection to the purchasing public since the manu-
facturer is in the best position to provide such protection6 by pass-
ing the price of such protection on to the public at large. 2 This is
obviously a social policy which requires those who can best foresee
and absorb the costs of injuries to do so.1 3 Although not expressed
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791, 800 (1966).
60. See notes 30, 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
61. See Escola v. Coca Cola Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, _, 150 P.2d 436, 440-
41 (1944) (separate opinion).
62. Leeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEX. L. REv. 855, 856 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. Rlv. 1329, 1333 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rv. 363, 366 (1965).
63. Dean Pound once denounced this as a piece of "authoritarian law,"
and a major step in the direction of socialism. Assuming that we are not nowadays
disposed to flee shrieking in terror from the prospect of a spot of socialism in our law
when the public interest demands it, the question remains whether our courts, our
legislators, and a public sentiment in general, are yet ready to adopt so sweeping a
legal philosophy, and to impose so heavy a burden abruptly and all at once upon all
piuduei ,. Thub far Lhere hasucik reiaLivy iidie indicaLion that the Lime is yet ripe
for what may very possibly be the law of fifty years ahead.
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in so many words in the cases, this social policy appears to be
accepted by most 4 and is, of course, implemented by imposition of
strict liability in tort.65
From these statements of policy, it is but a short step to the
justification of industry-wide liability based upon a greater ability
to spread the risk of injuries caused by defective products. Of
course, for this justification to apply to an entire industry, every
member must be found to manufacture defective products. If one
manufacturer is able to spread the risks of injury resulting from a
consumer's use of a defective product which he created, then the
entire industry is in a better position to spread the risks of injuries
resulting from the use of its defective products. There are more
"deep pockets" in an entire industry than in the trousers of the
individual manufacturer. The entire industry is also in a superior
position to broaden the base of those who must ultimately pay-i. e.,
the consumers. In this way, the base of protection is extended to
every consumer who purchases an identical product from a member
of the industry. Although this smells of socialism, such extension of
liability is an even fairer distribution of risks than is now possible
when strict liability is imposed upon a single manufacturer.
Enterprise Liability-Stream of Commerce Approach to Strict Lia-
bility in Tort
Imposition of strict liability in tort has been justified on the
basis of enterprise liability.67 Originally, enterprise liability was
imposed upon a seller for placing into the stream of commerce a
defective product which he knew would be used without inspection
for defects and which caused injury or property damage.6 This
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1120 (1960). Note that this was published in 1960 and it would appear that the law has moved
a little faster than Dean Prosser had anticipated.
64. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368-69 (E.D.
N.Y. 1972).
65. See Myers, The "Deep Pocket" Rule Revisited, 19 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 562
(1964); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791, 800 (1966).
66. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966).
67. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). See also RESTATEMENT II § 402A, comment c at 349-50.
68. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897,
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962).
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position of strict liability originally applied only to sellers of goods, 9
but as has been indicated," has expanded beyond such a boundary.
Enterprise liability now entails the stream of commerce approach
to strict liability. The stream of commerce approach presently al-
lows for parties other than the seller to be held strictly liable. The
scope of enterprise liability has expanded7 to the point where rede-
finition of such a concept in terms of the stream of commerce ap-
proach to strict liability is advisable:
[U]nder the stream-of-commerce approach to strict liabil-
ity no precise legal relationship . . . of the enterprise caus-
ing the defect to be manufactured or to the member most
closely connected with the customer is required before
the courts will impose strict liability. It is defendant's
participatory connection, for his personal profit or other
benefit, with the injury-producing product and with the
enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance
upon the product (and not the defendant's legal relation-
ship . . . with the manufacturer or other entities involved
in the manufacturing-marketing system) which calls for
imposition of strict liability.7 2
69. As Restatement II indicates:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the
case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is enti-
tled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons
to afford it are those who market the products.
RESTATEMENT II § 402A, comment c at 349-50.
70. See notes 30-37, 39, 41, and 45 supra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Note, The Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COL. L. REv. 1084
(1969).
72. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis added). In light of this redefinition, the court went on to
suggest that the holding in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr.
519 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969), (see note 28 supra) which denied a claim in strict liability in
tort against a product endorser might need reevaluation:
The rationale of Hanberry may warrant reevaluation. . . . Where it can be estab-
lished that defendant by its avowed testing was the responsible inducement for the
purchiase by plaintirf, we see no reason to hoid that defendant was not a necessary
instrument in the stream of commerce.
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Two possible extensions of this expanded concept of enterprise
liability will be considered. The first involves an entire industry
which produces products with a common defect, and the second
involves an entire industry that produces products without a com-
mon defect.
Enterprise Liability for Common Defects
Members of an entire industry who produce products with simi-
lar defects can be fitted easily into this broadened definition of
enterprise liability. Consider again the case of the Acme Ladder
Manufacturing Company along with Acme's relationship to other
members of its industry.73 All members produced ladders in compli-
ance with industry-wide standards. The standards were defective
but it was only Acme Ladder Manufacturing Company's ladder
which caused injury. By applying the expanded definition of enter-
prise liability, every member could be held strictly liable. Although
each member has no precise legal relationship to the member of the
industry who produced the defective product which ultimately in-
jured the consumer, each participated in the industry for his own
personal profit. He also benefitted from the expertise of an entire
industry which set certain standards of production which all mem-
bers believed to be adequate. By exploiting this expertise, all mem-
bers of the industry were able to put more of their resources to work
in other areas. At the same time, other members of the industry
benefitted from Acme's presence through the contributions that it
made. Because the stream of commerce approach to strict liability
does not call for precise legal relationships but only for a participa-
tory connection resulting in personal profit or other benefit, the
entire industry should be held strictly liable for Mr. Bartelli's in-
jury.
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., supra at 726-27, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The participatory
connection for personal profit or other benefit is further demonstrated in NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON PRODUCT SAFETY REP.: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1970):
The measure of voluntary consumer protection provided by the certification
programs of independent laboratories is substantial, but is theoretically flawed by
the laboratory's economic dependence on the goodwill of the manufacturer even if
the laboratory is nonprofit.
The protection afforded by various seals of approval is no better than the techni-
cal competence, product-testing protocols, and independence of the certifier. When
an industry association awards the seal, or when it is awarded in return for paid
advertising, the seal may convey a deceptive implication of third-party independ-
ence. Consumers appear to attribute to such endorsements a significance beyond
their specific meaning.
Id. at 2.
73. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
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A second example involves the transfusion of defective blood.74
It will be assumed that no method exists for the detection of serum
hepatitis in blood; it can also be assumed that some means for this
detection will one day be found. When the means for detecting the
presence of the virus do become available, it is highly probable that
the fruits of research leading to this detection will at once become
available to every hospital and blood bank in the land. Hence, al-
though no seller of blood can yet detect the presence of serum hepa-
titis in his product, he may one day benefit from the presence of
another seller who discovers the method of detecting the presence
of serum hepatitis.75 No seller of blood has any definable legal rela-
tionship with other sellers of blood; nonetheless, the seller is en-
gaged in an enterprise in which he may derive benefit from another's
presence. When a consumer is made ill by a transfusion of defective
blood, the stream of commerce approach to strict liability calls for
the imposition of strict liability in tort upon the entire industry.
Note that, so far, the expanded stream of commerce approach
to strict liability reaches the same results as would be reached
under the "control of defect" and "risk spreading" justifications of
strict liability being imposed upon an entire industry. But a much
more difficult problem exists when applying enterprise liability to
an industry which produces products without a common defect.
Enterprise Liability in the Absence of Common Defects
For the purposes of this section, it is assumed that no member
of an industry has a precise legal relationship with any other mem-
ber. However, it is not inconceivable that each member can derive
some benefit from the presence of others like him. This is especially
so when the industry has a trade association which gathers informa-
tion that is utilized by each member of the industry. It is also true
when the industry produces a product for which there is an elastic
demand and advertising is carried on by members of the industry.76
74. See note 37 supra. Whether the law in those cases will become universal law is left
to conjecture at this point.
75. Very likely, it will not be a "seller" at all who discovers the method of determining
the presence of serum hepatitis in blood. Nevertheless, some sellers undoubtedly underwrite
research in this direction.
76. N. BORDEN, THE ECONoMic EFFEcTs OF ADVERTISING 436-37 (1942). It is conjectured
here that there is a relatively elastic demand at this time for smaller, economical cars.
Certainly American manufacturers derived some benefit from the favorable reception of
foreign imports in this country; indeed, the American manufacturers soon followed with their
own models.
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Industry-wide strict liability in tort can be justified in several
ways in such cases. A few justifications will be offered here. First,
the argument of risk-spreading may be applied effectively in this
situation. The entire industry is in a better position to spread the
risk of injuries resulting from defective products than is the single
manufacturer-there are more deep pockets in an entire industry
than the pockets of a single manufacturer. Also, there may be cases
in which the manufacturer of a defective injury-causing device is
insolvent or defunct; obviously, no recovery can be had from such a
manufacturer. A question of social policy then arises: as between an
injured consumer or user and an entire industry, who should be
required to pay? In light of the deeper pockets of the entire industry
and its superior risk-spreading ability, the industry might justifia-
bly be held liable.
It should be observed that a participatory connection with an-
other enterprise for some personal profit or other benefit could be
found in almost any industry; in many instances, however, this
connection would be tenuous at best. Herein lies a primary weak-
ness in enterprise liability imposed upon an entire industry in the
absence of a common defect. This weakness could be overcome by
placing upon the claimant a high burden of proof in showing such a
participatory connection for personal profit or other benefit. For
example, a rebuttable presumption could arise in favor of the in-
dustry that no such connection exists in the absence of a common
defect. This presumption would not arise when the manufacturer of
the defective injury-causing device is insolvent for the policy reason
already noted.
A further limitation could be imposed upon industry-wide strict
liability in absence of a common defect: that limitation might be
based on the enterprise's negligence. If a single manufacturer pro-
duces a product with a defect through his own negligence, he should
not be permitted to call upon other members of the industry to pay
for the consequences of his fault. But note that an action against an
entire industry for an injury caused by the presence of a defect
which is not common to the products of all members of the industry
would place the burden of proving negligence upon those most able
to bear it, i.e., the other members of the industry. If these sugges-
tions were adopted there would be far fewer fictitious resorts to res
ipsa loquitur, for fellow members of an industry are those best quali-
fied to prove the existence of negligence.
[Vol. 7
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It might be contended that industry-wide liability in the ab-
sence of a common defect would create an attitude on the part of
industry members which would result in the lowering of industry-
wide standards of care in production. Arguably, this would occur
because an industry member would be held liable even if it were not
his defective product which produced injury; thus, there would be
no incentive for him to keep his standards of production high. Such
an argument is countered by the equally plausible possibility that
an entire industry which is held liable for an injury caused by the
defective product of one of its members would bring pressure upon
the delinquent manufacturer to improve his product. It is also
countered by the defense of negligence which could be made avail-
able to other members of the industry; by establishing negligence
as the proper grounds of recovery, the nonnegligent members of the
industry would be absolved of all liability.
As an example, consider the second factual situation which
began this note, i.e., the low standards of the automobile industry.77
Suppose that a defect in one car causes an injury or property dam-
age and that an action is brought against the entire industry.
Should the manufacturer of the injury-causing or property-
damaging car be defunct or insolvent, the entire industry would
contribute to the damages recoverable by the injured plaintiff in
strict liability. In all other cases, the claimant (either the injured
consumer or the industry) would be required to rebut the presump-
tion that no participatory connection among members of the indus-
try exists for personal profit or other benefit. Also, as indicated
above, those manufacturers who produce automobiles without a
similar defect could be permitted to raise and prove the existence
of negligence on the part of the particular manufacturer of the
injury-producing automobile.
Applications of Strict Liability Imposed Upon an Entire Industry
It is well and good to expound on the theories of strict liability
in tort which may be applicable to an entire industry as well as to
the individual manufacturer, but such theories are of little use to
the typical plaintiff who need go no farther than his immediate
seller to state his claim. If he sufficiently pleads his case, he will
usually be granted recovery from his immediate seller. Nonetheless,
77. Sei nteb 4-5 supra and accompawying text.
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there are two possibilities of industry-wide liability which might be
considered.
First, there is the case similar to Chance where the plaintiff
simply cannot identify the manufacturer or the seller of the defec-
tive product which caused his injury. However, such cases do not
abound in number and hence the benefits of industry-wide liability
would be reaped by very few.
The second and much more plausible application of strict lia-
bility imposed upon an entire industry would occur when the indi-
vidual manufacturer brings a cross-claim against his own industry
seeking indemnity. Two theories of indemnity will be examined and
then applied to an entire industry.18 The first theory will be based
on the element of control and the second theory will be based on
expanded enterprise liability.
The first theory is that of primary and secondary responsibil-
ity.7" Although the one held liable to an injured plaintiff may be the
manufacturer of the defective product, his liability should be sec-
ondary to the entity which caused the defect to be present."0 Hence,
if the entire industry has caused a defect to be present which ulti-
mately produces injury or property damage to a user or consumer
through imposed or adopted defective standards, the entire industry
should be the entity which bears primary responsibility for that
injury or property damage.8 ' To illustrate, consider the case of the
Acme Ladder Manufacturing Company again. In an action brought
against the company by Mr. Bartelli, assume that the Acme Ladder
Manufacturing Company is held strictly liable. This liability should
only be secondary to the liability of the entity which caused the
defect to be present in the first place-in this case, the entire indus-
try because it adopted defective standards. Thus, primary liability
should fall upon the entire ladder manufacturing industry.
78. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 313 (4th ed. 1971):
[I]t is extremely difficult to state any general rule or principle as to when indemnity
will be allowed and when it will not. . . . Indemnity is a shifting of responsibility
from the shoulders of one person to another; and the duty to indemnify will be
recognized where community opinion would consider that in justice the responsibility
should rest upon one rather than the other. This may be because of the relation of
the parties to one another, and the consequent duty owed; or it may be because of a
significant difference in the kind or quality of their conduct.
79. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 51 (4th ed. 1971).
80. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 24 (1965).
81. See Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
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The second theory is one which is implied from the expanded
concepts of enterprise liability. Recall that under expanded enter-
prise liability, no precise legal relationship is necessary for the impo-
sition of strict liability in tort; instead, a participatory connection
for personal profit or other benefit must be shown. 82 Hence, in an
effort to meet the justifications of strict tort liability more effec-
tively, the defendant-manufacturer should be permitted to cross-
claim against his entire industry. Of course, he would have to prove
the other members' participatory connection with his own enter-
prise for their own personal profit or other benefit. The defense of
negligence would then be available to other members of the indus-
try. The community certainly should recognize a certain sense of
justice in allowing a manufacturer to seek indemnity from his entire
industry8 in certain instances, as when an entire industry turns out
defective products. 8
CONCLUSION
The imposition of strict liability in tort has expanded upward
and downward from the guidelines laid down by the Restatement
II. The policies allowing such expansion should call for the imposi-
tion of strict liability in tort upon an entire industry under the
theories of control of the defect, risk spreading and expanded enter-
prise liability. Perhaps the most feasible way of imposing strict
liability in tort upon an entire industry is to allow a manufacturer
to seek indemnity from his own industry. This is a far more ade-
quate means of compensating the injured consumer and might serve
as an added inducement to industries to keep the cost of product-
related injuries from ever exceeding $5.5 billion annually.
82. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 725, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 325 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 78 supra.
84. The possibility of such liability being imposed might even induce entire industries
to form "consumer protection funds." Such funds could be administered in a manner similar
to the airline industry's strike funds. Each member would contribute to the fund and damages
awarded to injured consumers from strict liability actions would come from this fund.
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